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ABSTRACT
Over the past two decades organizational analysts have become increasingly intrigued by
those complex organizations which, despite appearing to be highly rationalized, paradoxically
seem to lack expected levels of internal coordination and control of their productive activities
and employees. The resulting body of research has popularized several new labels for such
organizations - loosely coupled systems and organized anarchies.
This essay evaluates this line of research by focusing on its analysis of schools, which are
usually considered to be the epitome of loosely structured organizations. In brief, I disagree
with this perspective's conclusions and argue that distinguishing the mode and degree of
organizational coupling and control depend on where, by what criteria and how one looks. My
contention is that although this debunking perspective ostensibly rejects tidy rational and
efficiency models of organization, ironically it unwittingly employs many of the latter's
assumptions of organizational behavior. In particular, these analysts adopt, I argue, a
framework that precludes the discovery of both the degree and forms of organizational control
within schools.
Subsequently, by re-examining and re-interpreting the existing research on school
organization, this paper identifies and illustrates a range of institutional and organizational
mechanisms by which schools and the work of teachers are constrained and circumscribed.

Perhaps the concept most central to the study of organizations is rationality.

Since the

translation of Max Weber's famous studies of bureaucracy, research traditions both celebrating
and debunking the theoretical and practical usefulness of organizational rationality have
dominated the study of organizations.

Over the past two decades, a number of organization

theorists, representing a current manifestation of the debunking view, have focused renewed
interest on those organizations which, despite being structured as classic Weberian
bureaucracies, appear not to be rational, purposeful systems.

Such researchers have

popularized a colorful vocabulary to describe such organizations: "garbage cans" and "organized
anarchies," "decoupled organizations," and "loosely coupled systems."
This essay evaluates the resulting body of work - which I will refer to as the loose
coupling perspective - by examining its analysis of the structure and features of educational
organizations.

Schools are a key case precisely because they are considered extreme in their

degree of loose coupling and have been the focus of much of this research.

Schools, these

analysts have claimed, are characterized by unusually high levels of decentralization and
disorganization and abnormally low levels of coordination, consensus and control.

Although

this view of educational systems has long been the conventional wisdom among organization
theorists, there are, however, good reasons to re-assess its validity and the structure of school
organizations.
Recently, researchers from the field of education have begun to popularize a completely
different view of the organization of schools.

Rather than decentralized and loosely controlled,

this newer view finds schools to be the epitome of top-down, overly controlled, centralized
bureaucracies.

So far, this small but growing group has been largely concerned with school

reform and education policy.

Its orientation is unabashedly humanistic and applied; it seeks to
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empower and professionalize teachers and restructure schools.

However, as of yet, there has

been little systematic critique or examination of the theory and methods of the older view of
schools; the new view simply offers a different model.
what has been the prevailing view.

But it is necessary to look closely at

Not only do many still accept its version of school

organization, but it is deeply rooted in mainstream organization theory.

By re-examining the

case of schools, I seek to offer a critique of both the loose coupling perspective, in particular, and
the study of organizational coupling and control, in general.

For, if schools, long thought to be

the epitome of loosely coupled systems, are in fact not, it suggests we need rethink and revisit
the theory and method by which organization theorists have examined coupling and control in
general.
Part 1 first lays out the intellectual roots of the loose coupling perspective.

I explain

how the study of educational organizations has come to be an important problem - an anomaly in the interdisciplinarian field of organization theory.

Part 2 begins my evaluation of the loose

coupling perspective by turning to several key assumptions underlying this research.

My

argument is that distinguishing the mode and degree of organizational coupling and control
depend on where, by what criteria and how one looks.

In particular, these analysts adopt, I

contend, a framework that impedes the discovery of both the degree and forms of organizational
control in schools.
Part 3 of this paper offers an alternative view of the organizational structure of schools.
My argument is grounded in existing empirical materials.

I have not attempted a

comprehensive analysis of the existing research on educational administration, the teaching
occupation, nor the organization of schooling, but have drawn from a range of materials
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concerned with all of these topics in order to illustrate the range of institutional and
organizational mechanisms by which schools and the work of teachers are constrained.
In Part 4, I return to the larger paradigm underlying the loose coupling perspective.

My

contention is that although this debunking perspective ostensibly rejects tidy rational and
efficiency models of organization, ironically, it unwittingly employs many of the latter's same
fundamental notions of organizational behavior. I conclude that it is the resulting
underembedded framework, which overlooks and underemphasizes the social organization and
institutional character of organizations, that is responsible for the anomaly of loosely coupled
organizations.
1. The Loose Coupling Perspective
Starting from Max Weber's classic analyses (1946, 1947), organization theorists have
traditionally begun with the assumption that the rational organization is the most efficient and
functional answer to those concerned with the problem of organizing large numbers of people in
accomplishing large scale tasks.

To Weber, bureaucracy is the modern embodiment of

rationality - the creation of systems of impersonal rules and roles as the means to accomplish
planned ends.
However, since its inception, the study of complex organizations has been characterized
by a tension between theoretical and applied models emphasizing rationality, technical efficiency
and functional coordination on the one hand, and the reality of life in organizations on the other.
Many researchers and practitioners, rarely finding organizational realities to conform fully to the
blueprint of formalized, specialized, standardized structure, have lost confidence in both the
explanatory power and the practical applicability of rational interpretations of the classic
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Weberian model.

As a result, over the years organizational research has progressively

emphasized the degree to which employees' sentiments, human relations, informal structures,
dysfunctional attributes, uncertainties, contingencies, and environmental influences all work to
limit organizational rationality (Zey-Ferrell and Aiken 1981; Pfeffer 1982; Scott 1987).
Approaches qualifying rational models reached an extreme in the 1970's with the
ascendancy of post-rational organization theories using the vocabulary of loose coupling to
describe this tension.

This perspective's roots lie in the work of several varied streams of

research: garbage can theory (Cohen et al. 1972; March and Olsen 1976); institutional theory
(Meyer and Rowan 1977, 1978; Meyer et al. 1978; Rowan 1982; Meyer and Scott 1983; Meyer
1984); and the organizational social psychology of Weick (1976, 1979, 1984).

In order to

elucidate the theoretical assumptions underlying the loose coupling perspective, I will briefly
review these three major intellectual roots.
A.) Organizations as Organized Anarchies
Organized anarchy and garbage can theory was the first major explication of the loose
coupling perspective.

These ideas were a logical extension of March and Simon's (1958; Simon

1957) earlier work on the boundedness to rationality in organizational decision making and Cyert
and March's (1963) work on the pluralistic character of organizational order.
The strength of this view lies in the ability to draw attention to the indeterminacy and
anarchy of decision-making processes, at the core of organizations.

For instance, March and

Olsen argue that in reality "individuals find themselves in a more complex, less stable and less
understood world than that described by standard theories of organizational choice.

They are

placed in a world over which they often have only modest control" (March and Olsen 1976, p.
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21).

Such theorists have found this non-rationality to be especially true in organizations, such

as schools and universities, which appear to have unclear and little understood methods or
technologies, inconsistent and fluid participation by actors and ambiguous or uncertain goals.
Under such conditions, decision-making mechanisms become analogous to garbage cans,
wherein rules, plans, goals, solutions, interests and actors are incoherently mixed and matched.
Research in this tradition provides insightful descriptions of organizations in which choices come
before plans; where major decisions are made without due concern; where participants fight over
even minor decisions but then ignore their implementation; where methods are disconnected
from outcomes; and where decisions seem to result from serendipitous encounters.

Rationality

here is not simply constrained by human limitations but becomes an after-the-fact reconstruction
to organize and manage an impression of orderliness which, in fact, does not exist.
B.) Organizations as Loosely Coupled Systems
A second source of development of the loose coupling perspective is the organizational
social psychology of Weick (1976, 1979, 1984). It was Weick's work that popularized the
vocabulary of organizations as loosely coupled systems.

In his view, these are organizations

and systems composed of autonomous elements that are often unresponsive to one another,
rather than rationally and hierarchically controlled. Loose coupling comes in a number of
forms, according to Weick, including the absence of regulations, the failure of superordinates to
influence subordinates, decentralization of power leading to employee autonomy, disconnections
of structures from tasks, planned unresponsiveness and a lack of goal consensus.

In his view,

again, schools, in particular, are characterized by such ambiguities and uncertainties supposedly
found to a lesser extent in traditional production and business organizations.

These
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characteristics arise from confusion surrounding the technology of teaching: how learning
actually happens, the difficulties of predicting and measuring educational outcomes, and the
changing influence of curricular and methodological innovations.
These two streams of research and theory have been concerned with how to make sense
of the micro-processes of organizational decision making and the role of management under
conditions of ambiguity.

However, they do not question the conventional role of organizational

coordination and control, which while ever more complex and elusive, are still assumed extant,
necessary and functional.
Nevertheless, the implications of such views bring the above-mentioned rationality
tension within organization theory to a head and suggest several critical questions: If the formal
properties of organizations, and the bureaucratic mechanisms described by Weber, do not
function as means of coordination, what is their purpose? Furthermore, if organizations are
uncoordinated and uncontrolled, how are organizational and social order achieved? How do
organizations remain stable and why do they generally look alike? Alternatively, if the formal
properties are mechanisms of control, but terribly inefficient, why do they continue to exist?
Why are most organizations, whether private or public, large or small, organized
bureaucratically? Why has Weber's prediction of the growth of rationalization and its
embodiment in bureaucratization come true? Such fundamental questions lie at the heart of
organization theory.
C.) Organizations as Institutions
A third major source of development of the loose coupling perspective - institutional
theory - constructs another alternative to conventional organizational models as an answer to
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these questions (Meyer and Scott 1983; Meyer et al. 1978; Meyer and Rowan 1977,1978; Rowan
1982; Meyer 1984).2

Institutional theory, while a distinctly different approach to organizational

analysis from that of Weick and Cohen et al., shares their emphasis on loose coupling and is, to a
large extent, an explanation of it.

Its contribution has been to transcend traditional task-oriented

explanations of organizations and resurrect and reconstruct Selznick's (1949) notion of
institutionalization as the source of organization structure.
In this view, rather than coordination and control of task, activity and exchange, the
surrounding macro-level societal order is the source of organizational features. Institutionalists
argue that organizational structure is the institutionalization of societal myths, lore, ideologies
and norms as to what particular organizations should be.
The image conveyed by institutional theories is one of form over substance - a
Goffmanesque (1959) presentation of engineered impressions, but at the level of organizational
structure.

This structural conformity is far more important than what actually transpires inside

organizations because "organizations that do so increase their legitimacy and their survival
prospects, independent of the immediate efficacy of the acquired practices and procedures"
(Meyer and Scott 1983, p. 21).
Institutionalists argue that because structure is tightly coupled with the environment,
internal productive activity must, in turn, necessarily be decoupled from organizational structure.
As a result, such organizations divide into two levels: tight coupling at the interorganizational
level causes loose coupling at the intraorganizational level.

Organizations decouple, that is,

2. Institutional theory is not one theory but rather several theories and approaches that are not entirely
consistent or cohesive. For recent reviews of this genre see Zucker (1987, 1988) and Scott (1988). Here, I will
focus on that branch associated with the work of Scott, Meyer, Rowan and their associates.
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intentionally neglect to adequately control their work processes for several reasons.

It serves to

mask inconsistencies, irrationalities and inefficiencies - in short poor performance - which might
undermine public faith in the organization.

It generates satisfaction and commitment on the

part of employees and finally, it allows local input into organizational processes without
disrupting outward institutional conformity.

Hence, in their view, loose coupling is both

inevitable and inefficient, both functional and dysfunctional.
D.) The Anomaly of Educational Organizations
The ideas and work of the above streams of thought have generated a great deal of
interest in the sources, forms and variations of order in organizations.

The resulting body of

research is highly varied - focusing on different types of organizations (private, public,
non-profit), different levels of analysis (interorganizational, intraorganizational), different units
of analysis (individuals, organizations, populations) and different types of linkages (control,
communication, consensus, cohesion, coordination).

In addition, among the various proponents

of the loose coupling thesis, there are a large number of differences in the usage and definition of
the concept itself.

Weick (1976) alone lists fifteen forms that loose coupling may assume.

Despite the wide range of uses to which the ideas of loose coupling have been put, there
is, nevertheless, common ground: the insightful emphasis on the degree to which organizations
which appear to be rational are, in fact, not.

More specifically, it is possible to distinguish

several characteristics commonly used to define loosely coupled organizations:
1. unclear, diverse or ambiguous organizational means and goals.
2. low levels of coordination of employees' productive activities.
3. low levels of organizational control:
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-high levels of employee autonomy.
-low levels of managerial authority.
Loosely coupled organizations, then, are those that exhibit an inordinate lack of cohesion
and integration.

But, it is power - the ability of one actor to control or influence another -

which lies at the crux of the loose coupling concept and which is thus the central to my analysis.
Indeed, Aldrich, summarizing research on organizational coupling, notes that, "the major
determinant of coupling [is] the degree of hierarchical control by a central authority," (1978, p.
52).

As a result, empirical research on organizational coupling typically focusses on the degree

of centralized control or decentralized delegation in organizations.
Although these post-rationalists generalize to other types of organizations, their focus has
largely been on the service and public sectors.

Moreover, this perspective has given

educational organizations, and public elementary and secondary schools in particular, a central
place; it deems schools the archetypal loosely coupled systems (Weick 1976; Meyer and Scott
1983).

As a result, this image of schools has become the conventional wisdom in the field of

organization theory (Corwin 1981; Tyler 1988).
To educationists, the notion that educational organizations are unusual bureaucracies is
not new.

Since Dewey (1902) and the later field studies of Waller (1932) and Becker (1953),

researchers from the field of education have consistently found teachers' work to be inherently
incompatible with formal bureaucratization.

But it was Bidwell (1965) who embedded this

tension in a theoretical framework that laid the foundation of thinking on school organization for
several decades, including that of the loose coupling perspective.

In his formulation, schools

are a theoretically significant case of bureaucratic organization precisely because of their
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"structural looseness." Their unique technology (affective, non-tangible, fluid) and clientele
(non-voluntary and as-yet unsocialized) place limits on the bureaucratization and rationalization
of teachers' work.
Among the most prominent empirical work supporting this view has been
(1969, 1973, 1975, 1977).

that of Lortie

He argued that teaching is "least controlled by specific and literally

enforced rules and regulations," and "compared to other systems of work, schools still provide
considerable occasion for the exercise of personal discretion by classroom teachers" (1969, p. 14;
1977, p. 30).

As a result, he concluded that "self-contained classrooms are small universes of

control with the teacher in command; administrators refer, ambivalently, to the `closed door'
which the teacher can put between herself and administrative surveillance" (1969, p.9).
Thus, it is no coincidence that the current loose coupling perspective largely developed
out of research in educational organizations.
anomalies for the rational paradigm.

The latter have long been unexplained Kuhnian

In fact, Ouchi and Wilkins, in their review of

organizational culture analysis, go so far as to claim that, "It was the resistance of school systems
to bureaucratic interpretation that brought to an end the study of formal organization structure"
(1985, p. 467). It is for these reasons that the loose coupling perspective is best evaluated using
the case of schools.
And, there are good reasons to undertake such a re-evaluation.
Recently, researchers from the field of education have begun to popularize a very
different view of the organization of schools.3

3. Among the most prominent work in this vein to date is that of Darling-Hammond and Wise (1985); Conley
and Cooper (1991); Corcoran et al. (1988), Rosenholtz (1989), Sergiovanni and Moore (1989); Bacharach et al.
(1988, 1990), and Shedd and Bacharach (1991).
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Like previous research on school organization, this line of analysis begins with the assumption
that education and bureaucratization are fundamentally incompatible.

However, rather than

finding the resulting problem to be organizational looseness and decentralization, they argue that
bureaucratization has produced an overly centralized system with factory-like working
conditions.

In particular, they find that teachers have too little influence over important school

decisions and issues.

Such disempowerment and deprofessionalization results, they show, in

serious organizational problems, including dissatisfaction, stress and loss of commitment among
faculties.

With the looming threat of a national teacher shortage and alarming attrition and

turnover rates (Rollefson 1990; Darling-Hammond 1987), this new view has picked up steam.
So far, this newer view has been largely concerned with school reform and education policy.

It

seeks to "restructure" schools by increasing "teacher empowerment" through "school-based
management." There has been little systematic critique or examination of the theory and
methods of the older view of schools; the new view simply offers a different model.

It is to

such an examination that I now turn.
2. The Underlying Assumptions of the Loose Coupling Perspective
I begin my evaluation of the loose coupling perspective by examining several key
assumptions underlying this research.

My argument, developed below, is that the assessment of

organizational coupling and control are highly dependent on where, by what criteria and how one
examines them.

It is my contention that research subscribing to the loose coupling perspective

rests on a set of overlapping assumptions that impede the discovery of both the degree and forms
of control and coupling within schools.
A. The Goal of Schools
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When it comes to analyzing organizations, researchers must, of course, first determine
the key functions and goals of an organization, prior to analyzing how they are organized and
with what success.

When it comes to schools, researchers traditionally have divided school

activities into two zones: educational activities within classrooms and administrative support
functions out of classrooms (e.g. Lortie 1969; Meyer and Rowan 1983).

One of the key

assumptions underlying the loose coupling perspective is that the crucial educational activity, the
essence of the work of teachers and the primary function and goal of schools is classroom
instruction.
The classroom/school dichotomy is not unfamiliar; it is an adaptation of a traditional
framework in organizational analysis that divides organizations into technical and managerial
systems.

Perhaps first formalized by Parsons (1960), this model of organizational life assumes

a functional separation between productive activities in the "technical core" and administrative
activities in the "managerial structure" of organizations.

This traditional theoretical framework

mirrors the industrial or business unionism model of collective bargaining which came of age
with the New Deal (Kochan et al. 1986; Lipset, Trow and Coleman 1956).

In this model, both

employers and employees agree that organizational policy, overall strategy and administrative
decisions are the responsibility of management. Hence, the scope of legitimate employee input,
bargaining and grievance is limited to "bread and butter" issues, working conditions, job
security, and activity within the technical core. The "contested terrain" becomes the definition
of "a fair day's pay for a fair day's work" (Edwards 1979). In this context, Barnard (1938) aptly
described everything not directly affecting employees' work-a-day lives as their "zone of
indifference."
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In the realm of education, both practitioners (Johnson 1984; Corcoran et al. 1988) and
researchers (Conley 1991; Tyler 1988) alike have adopted this model. These groups equate the
managerial zone with school-wide coordination, planning and resource allocation activities.

In

turn, they equate the technical and productive core with the educational activities of schools.
When it comes to operationalizing the latter concept, although most researchers note that schools
have a wide range of functions and goals, they, understandably enough, typically assume
classroom instruction to be the primary educational activity of schools and the essence of the
work of teachers.
Hence, when these researchers analyze how loose or tight and how centralized or
decentralized schools are, they commonly ask, how much discretion do teachers have, or
alternatively, how much control do administrators have over instructional matters within
classrooms? For the loose coupling perspective, lack of control revolves around this focus on
instruction and the difficulties of rationalizing such an activity. Furthermore, whether they
presume the ambiguities of such interactional work are potentially tractable or not, loose
coupling analysts conclude that schools make few attempts to find out. The result of this
decoupling is that schools perform inefficiently in regard to their primary task of instruction.
As Meyer, Scott and Deal put it: "Thus, the standard social science portrait of schools depicts
weak and ineffective organizations with little internal rationalization of work, and little capacity
to produce useful effects as measured by student performance" (1983, p. 48).
One problem with this line of analysis of schools is that it accepts without question the
necessity of the classroom/school division of labor in schools.

However, one cannot assume

that an organization's administrative, distributive and strategic decisions are simply supportive
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and housekeeping activities, best left to administrators.

The one-sidedness of this traditional

focus is illustrated by comparison to the alternative focus adopted by newer educational research
promoting teacher empowerment.
This newer reform view also adopts the traditional classroom/school, core/structure
dichotomy, and also holds that inefficiency arises from the organizational structure of schools.
But, this reform view does not assume that a division of labor in which teachers instruct and
principals manage is functional and necessary.

In contrast, when analyzing how centralized or

decentralized schools are, they ask, how much say do teachers have or, alternatively, how much
control do administrators have over school-wide matters outside of classrooms?

They find

very little teacher control and much administrative discretion over policy, resource allocation and
planning and have concluded that schools are overly centralized (e.g. Rosenholtz 1989;
Bacharach et al. 1988; Conley and Cooper 1991; Shedd and Bacharach 1991).

In their view,

the source of many school problems lies in teachers' relative lack of input into the managerial
zone, rather than in the lack of administrative control over the instructional zone. Their
conclusion is explicitly prescriptive: schools should "involve teachers more fully in
decision-making processes" (Bacharach et al. 1988, p. 163).
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Figure 1
Conventional View of the Division of Labor within Schools
Zones
Instruction
Within-the-Classroom Zone
(Technical Core)
Allocation and Coordination
School-wide Zone
(Managerial Structure)

Distribution of Labor
Controlled by Teachers

Controlled by Administrators

The different foci of the two views arise from the different theoretical persuasions of each
perspective.

One emphasizes managerial needs for control; the other emphasizes employee

needs for input.

But notably, both agree on the existing division of labor within schools:

"Schools are marked by a `traditional influence pattern' in which decisions are differentiated by
locale and position...administrators make strategic decisions outside of classrooms and teachers
make operational decisions inside of classrooms" (Conley 1991, pp. 237-8; see Figure 1).
Moreover, and the central point here, is that despite opposing viewpoints, almost all researchers
begin with the initial assumption that classroom instruction is the primary educational function
of schools.

Such striking agreement from otherwise diverse viewpoints suggests the validity of

this view of the division of labor within schools.
There is, however, a very significant problem with this shared wisdom - its initial
assumption is inconsistent with the findings of most sociological studies of education.
Beginning with Durkheim (1925), continuing through Parsons (1959) and related
functionalist theorists of education (e.g. Henry 1965; Dreeben 1968), and up to current
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revisionist and critical analysts of schools (e.g. Katz 1972; Bowles and Gintis 1976),
investigators have viewed the major purpose of educational organizations to lie in their social
and institutional functions. Indeed, many have argued that with the diminution of the family's
role in society, schools have increasingly taken on social tasks once solely reserved for parents,
churches and communities (e.g. Coleman and Hoffer 1987).

That is, the most important task of

schools is the passing on of society's social order to the next generation.
overlapping activities.

This involves two

The first is socialization or the inculcation of societal norms, beliefs and

roles - what Durkheim referred to as the moral order and the collective conscience.

The second

is differentiation or the reproduction of a society's patterns of horizontal and vertical
stratification.

Commonly referred to as tracking, students are, throughout their school careers,

systematically tested, evaluated, classified, sorted and credentialed in accordance with normative
criteria.

This sorting process directs students towards future social, occupational, status and

class categories.
By underemphasizing such social functions of schools, and equating teachers' work with
classroom instruction, researchers have not directly specified nor examined the organization of
all the most important educational tasks transpiring within schools and classrooms.

Indeed, any

autonomy and looseness around instructional matters may be because that sample of activities
does not represent the most crucial or important tasks of schools.

Hence, when it comes to

analyzing the organization and performance of teachers' work, many researchers may be looking
in the wrong place.
B. The Organizational Structure of Schools
Along with choosing an appropriate focus, a second issue for organizational analysts is

18

that of deciding the criteria by which they will evaluate a given type of organization.
Organizational looseness, coupling, control and decentralization are, it must be remembered,
relative concepts and the question must always be posed - compared to what?

In the loose

coupling perspective the point of comparison is, of course, the rational organization. A second
key assumption underlying the loose coupling perspective is that this traditional ideal is the
paragon of organizational control and the appropriate standard by which to evaluate the structure
of schools.
The rational organization exhibits standardization, specialization, formalization and, of
foremost importance, control.

The prototype of this traditional ideal is the bureaucracy, its

clearest embodiment is the modern production factory and its guiding image is the machine
(Scott 1987).

Non-rationality and de-bureaucratization are deviations from this state of affairs.

Schools are a key example of such deviation; they not only do not fit the classic rational
bureaucratic ideal, but they are deemed the epitome of the non-rational, de-bureaucratized,
decoupled organization.
One problem with this comparison is that it accepts without question the validity of this
standard.

That is, the loose coupling perspective has failed to first ask if factories and by

implication, factory workers are the appropriate criteria by which to judge schools and teachers.
It is important to take care in choosing one's standards of comparison because they tend
to shape one's results.

In this case, the comparison does so by blurring the distinction between

formal and substantive rationality.

Formal rationality has to do with how routinized and

bureaucratized an organization is. Substantive rationality is concerned with how sensible and
valuable a form is.

Weber himself stressed that regardless of the degree of formal rationality,
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whether observers find organizations to be characterized by substantive rationality depends on
what values and standards they hold (Weber 1947, pp. 185,215). That is, how bureaucratized
an organization is and how bureaucratized it should be are two separate issues.

The former is

descriptive; the latter prescriptive.
In accepting the rational organization as its reference point, the loose coupling approach
understates the implications of multiple constituencies, criteria and interests for the definition of
appropriate school organization. With a plurality of functions and interested parties, the
question of how schools should be structured and how they should be assessed are value-laden
issues (cf. Cameron and Whetten 1983; Kanter 1981).
A close look at the loose coupling perspective indicates the dominance of managerial
criteria.

Looseness, in this perspective, is not a lack of social order altogether, but a lack of

centralized control.

Hence, when Weick describes loose coupling as disconnection "between

headquarters and the field" (1984, p. 397), he is referring to the control of teachers by
administrators, not vice versa.

The underlying assumption here is that hierarchy is functional

and proper. This overlooks the possibilities of non-hierarchical modes of organization.

After

all, that organizations do not exhibit the characteristics of the machine model, does not mean that
they lack order, coordination or purpose.
The extent to which the criteria adopted by the loose coupling perspective are implicitly
value laden is illustrated by comparison to the alternative focus adopted by newer educational
research focussing on teacher disempowerment. This view does not assume bureaucratic
hierarchy to be functional, necessary nor inevitable.

Rather than comparing schools to the

machine model, the new view compares schools to another traditional ideal - the professional
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model of organization.

In this view: "Teachers are not (but ought to be) treated as

professionals; schools are (and ought not to be) top-heavy bureaucracies; and no significant
improvements can occur in America's systems of public education unless schools are
fundamentally restructured (Shedd and Bacharach 1991, p. 1).
Figure 2
The Comparison of Schools with Other Organizations
Type of Organization

Distribution of Power

Loose Coupling Perspective
Rational Bureaucracy
Educational Organization

Centralized
Decentralized

Disempowerment Perspective
Professional Organization
Educational Bureaucracy

Decentralized
Centralized

In essence, each of these two views assumes a relationship between two variables: type of
organization and their degree of centralized control.
which schools are compared varies.

The type of organization, however, to

As with their differing foci concerning the division of

labor in schools, one emphasizes managerial needs for control; the other emphasizes employee
needs for autonomy and input.

As Figure 2 shows, each viewpoint comes to opposite

conclusions concerning how schools stand.
Given their different assumptions, both viewpoints may well be correct.

However,

actually empirically testing either of these comparisons is difficult. In fact, school researchers
rarely do so - their comparison organizations are largely hypothetical ideals of professionals or
proletarians.

This is understandable.

Such data are rarely available and in general,

cross-organizational or cross-occupational comparisons are inherently difficult because many

21

decisions are not comparable and questionnaires cannot be kept consistent (Simpson 1985). It
would be very difficult, for instance, to compare how much power lawyers have within legal
firms, and factory workers have within plants with what teachers have within schools. The
problem, however, is that, in order to conduct plausible analyses of organization it is necessary to
separate the researcher's own underlying theoretical persuasion - their definition of what is
proper - from their assessment of what is.

That is, one's criteria may bias one's results.

Along with the dilemma of determining the criteria by which one evaluates an
organization, there is also, a second problem with these comparisons - the initial assumption that
rational bureaucracy is synonymous with centralization and, in turn, that the lack of rational
bureaucracy is synonymous with decentralization. This traditional dichotomy, like that
between loose and tight, is a misleading oversimplification.
Bureaucracy is only one mode of many by which groups of individuals may be organized
in the pursuit of larger goals and tasks.

Rational bureaucracies are indeed centrally controlled

organizations, but the latter are not always rational bureaucracies.

Weber himself described

two other modes of centralized organizational control: that based on personal loyalty to a leader
and that based on traditional customs.

What distinguishes the bureaucratic mode is formal

rationality. That is, bureaucracy replaces obedience to individuals or traditions with obedience
to impersonal rules and roles.

By no means, can it be assumed that bureaucracy is the most

controlled or centralized of settings.

Nor can it be assumed that the absence of bureaucracy in

organizations is synonymous with employee autonomy and organizational decentralization.
For instance, researchers invariably make the mistake of associating de-bureaucratization
with a paucity of rules and regulations for teachers or with the extent to which teachers may be
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able to bypass rules and regulations.

But, it is important to remember that pockets of

non-rationalization and de-bureaucratization are not limited to subordinates.

Administrators

and superordinates may also be subject to too few rules, inadequate accountability or enjoy wide
autonomy.

Or they may also be able to evade, ignore or resist the rules that do exist - with

consequences for employee control.

Indeed, a lack of or the skirting of standardized,

authorized regulations, could be a source of administrative power and organizational centralized
control rather than the opposite.
Indeed, loose coupling researchers view any kind of regulation on administrative
prerogatives as an impediment to organizational control - almost as if rules for managers were a
wrong use of bureaucratic rationality.
For example, school researchers typically point out that the standardization of teachers' salaries,
promotions and tenure all lessen teachers' dependency on superordinates and thus undermine
their loyalty and obedience to school administrators (e.g. Lortie 1969, 1975).

But this misses

what this kind of rationalization, so fundamental to bureaucracy in general, does provide - the
loyalty and obedience of employees to the organization.
Weber stated this clearly: "Entrance into an office...is considered an acceptance of a
specific obligation of faithful management in return for a secure existence.

It is decisive for the

specific nature of modern loyalty to an office that ... it does not establish a relationship to a
person" (Weber 1946, p. 199).

"Where legal guarantees against arbitrary dismissal...are

developed, they merely serve to guarantee a strictly objective discharge of office duties free from
all personal considerations" (Weber 1946, p. 202).
Thus, in bureaucracy employees exchange loyalty for security.

Limitations on superordinate

23

prerogatives are not a form of decentralization, but are a different, and ingenious, form of
centralized control.
In sum, in order to come to satisfactory conclusions about the nature of school
organizational structure it is important to move beyond comparisons based on simplified and
value-laden dichotomies, such as loose/tight, coupled/decoupled, bureaucratic/non-bureaucratic,
or rational/non-rational. It is necessary to first develop a sound theoretically-based comparison
point, make this explicit and then utilize it in systematic empirical comparisons.
C. The Assessment of Power and Control in Schools
Along with choosing an appropriate focus and deciding the criteria by which they will
evaluate an organization, a third issue for analysts of control in organizations is deciding how to
actually assess this variable.

Students of power have long noted the difficulties in adequately

conceptualizing and measuring the social and institutional organization of power and control
(e.g. Lukes 1974; Gaventa 1980; Pfeffer 1981; Frey 1971, 1985; Hartsock 1985).

A third

assumption of the loose coupling perspective is that organizational control in schools can be
adequately assessed by examining visible and direct means of administrative influence and
employee accountability.
Typical of this approach is the influential work of the institutionalists.

Using survey

data, the institutionalists primarily looked at three means by which school organizations control
the work of teachers: the existence of detailed school policies, administrative inspection of
teachers at work and the administrative use of students' examination scores as an output measure
of teachers (e.g. Meyer and Scott 1983, pp. 50-1,57,74,84).

They found that "schools develop

few policies in the areas of greatest significance for their central goals and purposes" (1983, p.
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58).

Moreover, they also found little follow up for those policies that do exist: "Neither

teaching nor its output in student socialization is subject to serious organizational evaluation and
inspection" (1983, p.74; and Dornbusch and Scott 1975).

Finally, even if there were rules and

even if they were monitored for compliance, such control would not be possible, they conclude,
because school administrators' "authority to carry out these activities is in fact evanescent"
(1983, p.75).
The problem with this approach is that it ignores a whole range of alternative forms by
which power and control may operate in organizations (cf. Simpson 1985; Edwards 1979; Pfeffer
1981).
Perrow (1986), for instance, has persuasively argued that far more effective than direct
controls, such as rules, regulations and sanctions in organizations, are bureaucratic controls,
wherein the range of behavior and responsibility is restricted by specialization, standardization,
and formalization.

This is the role of the division of labor.

The division of labor subdivides organizational decision making and tasks into a series of
steps.

These steps are sequential, that is, some steps are more fundamental and important than

others and some decisions temporally come after others and are nested within their predecessors.
Different steps of differing importance are delegated to different employee and role groups
within an organization.

The result is a hierarchical structure of circumscribed roles.

the division of labor is, at heart, a division of power - it is fundamentally hierarchical.

Hence,
By

definition, it limits the areas in which members have responsibility and authority and is thus a
potential means of both organizational coordination and control.

It follows that one can assess

organizational centralization by the degree to which important steps, tasks and decisions are

25

delegated downward among employees or concentrated upward among managers.
Besides bureaucratic controls, Perrow also suggests the crucial importance of unobtrusive
organizational controls, in which underlying cognitive premises are set through norms,
expectations and precedents.

In order to assess the existence and effectiveness of this form of

control it is necessary to examine the "non-decisions" taken for granted by participants and
researchers alike, and the occupational and organizational culture of schools.

In both of

these less-direct forms of control an apparent autonomy and independence of employees may
exist precisely because of the centralization of the power of employers.

As a result, the absence

of obvious controls may be an indicator of the efficacy of these other mechanisms, not of
looseness.

An adequate analysis of control in schools must therefore examine a wide range of

possible mechanisms both direct and indirect, formal and informal prior to making conclusions
concerning the degree of control.

In sum, the objective of the foregoing section has been to show that assessments of
organizational coupling and control are highly dependent on where, by what criteria and how one
examines them.

It has been my contention that research subscribing to the loose coupling

perspective rests on a series of assumptions that impede the discovery of the forms and degree of
control and coupling within schools.

This suggests that the conclusion that schools are loosely

coupled is premature and that we must rethink these underlying assumptions if we are to improve
our understanding of the organizational structure of schools.

Specifically, it is necessary to

examine the organization of all the key functions and goals of schools, to move beyond
oversimplified notions of loose/tight, bureaucratic/non-bureaucratic and coupled/decoupled and
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to examine a wide range of forms by which employee control might be obtained.

To do this I

now turn to a re-examination and re-interpretation of research on the organizational structure of
schools.

My discussion is necessarily selective, concentrating on studies, both old and new,

which illustrate the three general types of organizational control suggested by Perrow.
3. Forms of Control in Schools
A. Direct Controls
Among the most obvious and direct means of controlling and directing the behavior of
employees is through the use of rules, regulations, supervision and sanctions.

Although loose

coupling research holds that teachers' work in schools as free of such constraints, there is
substantial evidence to the contrary.
For instance, re-examination of the institutionalists' own data indicates that a large
percentage of teachers and administrators cite the existence of many detailed policies and
regulations for school activities.

The institutionalists solely focus on the domain of classroom

instruction and, they stress that school staffs do, indeed, report far fewer detailed policies for the
regulation of such issues (Meyer and Scott 1983, pp 50-1).

But what the institutionalists

overlook is that the issues most explicitly regulated fall within the all important non-instructional
domains of socialization, behavior inculcation, student evaluation, tracking and resource
allocation.
autonomy.

Even classroom instruction, however, is not necessarily an arena of teacher
A number of studies have shown the growing and widespread use of formal

curricular controls; teachers are issued guides outlining course objectives and topics,
standardized texts and matching tests.

The most intrusive examples of this form of

rationalization are the increasingly used "teacher proof" curricular programs.

In order to insure

27

uniformity, these pre-packaged programs specify in detail sequential "performance objectives"
for students, techniques for teachers and referenced tests as output controls (e.g. Goodlad 1984;
Fuhrman et al. 1988; Floden et al. 1988).
Rules, as long noted in the literature on organizational control, are only as effective as
their implementation.

That is, they must be monitored and enforced.

Although it is clear that

there are, in fact, regulations for teachers, the evidence is quite mixed as to how often and with
what degree of success teacher compliance is obtained.

Teachers are formally supervised and

evaluated but this is often infrequent and inconsistent (Wise et al. 1985).

Floden et al. (1988)

found, for instance, that in many settings teachers are neither rewarded nor punished for
following district rules concerning instruction.

On the other hand, others have reported that

teachers' practices are significantly impacted and circumscribed by the use of state or district
standardized tests as output measures (Rosenholtz 1985, 1989; Darling-Hammond and Wise
1985).
But, what most research, including that of the loose coupling perspective, overlooks are
the less formal, less rationalized means by which administrators can exert pressure on faculties.
Analysts of power in organizations have shown how individuals may be able to accrue power or
autonomy disproportionate to their official organizational role, if they are able to control
important resources or sources of uncertainty and dependency (Crozier 1964; Perrow 1986:
Kanter 1977; Pfeffer and Salancik 1978). The basis of power in resource dependency means
that among the most significant determinants of member compliance are the organization's range
of inducements, rewards and punishments.

Hence, administrators who control these, either

legitimately or not, have an important means of controlling employees.

There is evidence to
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suggest that schools are no exception.
Data on the distribution of decision-making power in schools suggest that school
administrators do indeed have a number of key levers with which to control teachers.

For

instance, most teachers and administrators report school principals to have substantially greater
influence than others, over key resources in the school: budgets, materials, students,
communications, space, and time.

Likewise, most perceive principals to have greater influence

over policy and administrative decisions: staff hiring and firing, overall curricular design, student
discipline codes, building arrangements and school schedule (e.g. Bacharach et al. 1988;
Corcoran et al. 1988; Firestone 1985; Conley 1991).
It is precisely because of this concentration of decision-making power that administrators
are provided with an array of levers with which to control staff behavior: the assignment of
rooms, distribution of classroom resources, assignment of courses to teachers, allocation of types
and quality of students, distribution of non-teaching duties, determination of class sizes, control
of special funding and clearance for field trips, projects or conferences and, ultimately, firing.
For example, the literature on school life has long noted a key area of vulnerability of the
teacher to administrative power arises because of the limited disciplinary authority of teachers.
As a result, teachers depend on being "backed up" in discipline problems with students or against
angry parents (Waller 1932; Bidwell 1965; Becker 1953; McPherson 1972; Willis 1977).
Numerous studies, both journalistic and sociological, attest to the consequences when teachers
do not comply with the existing school order and are not backed up.

For instance, Herndon

(1968, 1971) and Kozol (1967) both write revealingly of their experiences trying to implement
unconventional and open classrooms in the 1960's. Both faced escalating overt and coercive
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pressures to cease their nonconformity.
In sum, there is a range of evidence suggesting that, in fact, there are direct, obtrusive and
coercive controls of teachers' activities within schools.

Nevertheless, even if the loose coupling

perspective has under-emphasized the extent of such mechanisms, establishing the existence of
rules and enforcement is not sufficient to substantiate that intraorganizational control is achieved
in schools.

Analysts of organizational control tell us that direct controls tend to be less

efficacious and less efficient and their use in organizations is more likely associated with chronic
lack of compliance, situations of crisis or ultimately open conflict (Perrow 1986, pp. 128-131;
Ouchi 1977; Gaventa 1980).

Especially, coercive measures may generate resistance, require

frequent supervision and can be vulnerable to circumvention "behind the closed doors of the
classroom."

Because of such limitations, the question arises: are there more comprehensive

and more effective means to organize in control and organize out challenge, shirking or
non-compliance in schools?
B. Bureaucratic Controls
Less direct than rules is bureaucratic control - the hierarchy of standardized, specialized
and formalized roles, which, by definition, is supposed to circumscribe the areas in which
organization members have responsibility and authority. Thus, in order to determine whether
schools are or are not controlled organizations, a second place to look is at the division of labor
between administrators and teachers.

Although loose coupling research holds that the division

of labor within schools is a source of decentralization, autonomy, independence and decoupling,
there is evidence to the contrary.
For example, extensive data on the distribution of school decision-making show that the
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only domain into which teachers have substantial input is that of classroom instruction (e.g.
Firestone 1985; Corcoran et al. 1988; Bacharach et al. 1988; Conley 1991).

Especially

noteworthy is the data indicating that teachers have little influence over the all important
non-instructional functions of socialization and sorting within classrooms.
For instance, while the policing of classroom and school-wide behavior, values and
morals is usually considered the teachers' responsibility, the majority of teachers report they have
little say over the substance of such issues (Corcoran et al. 1988).

A pertinent example is the

taboo of critical or frank discussion of basic morals and norms, especially those concerning
sexuality, religion and political ideology (Ziegler and Peak 1970).
students is usually disallowed.

Use of one's first name with

Until recently, often teachers' dress and appearance were also

not up to their own discretion (McPherson 1972).
However, even within what is considered the primary realm of teachers' responsibility
and competence - the content and methods of classroom instruction - there are overlooked
constraints.

Contrary to their implicit portrayal in survey questionnaires, we cannot assume that

decisions concerning classroom and school issues are either equal or independent events. The
loose coupling perspective has not examined the degree to which higher-order decisions, over
which teachers have little influence, subtly circumscribe classroom activity and thus provide
intraorganizational control.
For instance, there is little question that the number, abilities and characteristics of
students a teacher is assigned, decisions made by the administration, shape the instructional
strategies teachers use (Filby et al. 1980).

The issue of who one teaches is important; teachers

rarely have the right to not teach particular students, such as those who are disruptive
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(McPherson 1972).

As such, teachers do not have the equivalent of management's right to hire

and fire or of a professional's right to pick and choose clientele.

This has important

implications for issues of discipline, because it removes the most fundamental source of leverage
and power that teachers may use against students - exclusion.

As a result, students who do not

voluntarily submit to the teacher's procedures and directives must be referred to the building
administration which, by definition, holds greater power with which to coerce (Waller 1932;
Becker 1953; Willis 1977).
Besides directly effecting teachers' practices, as described previously, prescribed
curricula, standardized course tests, and school grading policies also indirectly set the parameters
for what teachers do, shape their thinking as to their role, and define the goals of instruction and
education (McNeil 1988; Gamoran and Dreeben 1986; Bullough et al. 1984; Darling-Hammond
and Wise 1985).
Teachers' classroom autonomy is further constrained by the assignment of courses.

It is

common for teachers to have little discretion over what courses they teach (e.g. Firestone 1985).
This suggests that teachers can be required to teach subjects they feel neither competent nor
interested in teaching.
Research has also established the effect of school schedules and the allocation of time on
teachers' work and attitudes (Corbett et al. 1984).

The amounts of time allowed for staff

development, for personal contact with students and for lesson preparation all significantly
impact what teachers do in the classroom.

For instance, the teacher's ability to construct

relevant curricula and to develop an adequate understanding of student needs is clearly
constrained by their time and skills. Studies indicate that most teachers closely follow
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textbooks, whether prescribed by districts or not (e.g. McNeil 1988).
standardized course materials are useful tools for teachers.

Certainly, texts and

However, as Gitlin (1983) has

argued, this disengagement with the construction of courses can be a form of disempowerment;
in this case, teachers become technicians whose task is dictated by prefabricated packages on
which they depend (see also Bullough et al. 1988).
In sum, while it is true that teachers usually work alone in their individual classrooms and
with apparent discretion, they do so only within narrowly circumscribed limits. There is a great
deal of evidence to suggest that schools are highly bureaucratized settings in which the discretion
and authority of subordinate groups such as teachers are strongly delimited by the hierarchical
division of labor. This is not to deny variations in the behavior of teachers, but as the above
examples illustrate, these are primarily of style not substance.

School delegation may not

require elaborate mechanisms of accountability because, by definition, little of substance is
delegated.

In such cases, the use of relatively crude and direct levers is obviated because of this

prior less-obtrusive structuring.

As a result, the delegation of specialized, standardized tasks

delimits, rather than increases uncertainties for administrators and thus neutralizes the effects of
any employee non-compliance.
This finding is highly consistent with studies of control done across a range of types of
organizations.

For instance, critical analysts of the labor process in industrial settings have

insightfully shown how dividing work processes into stages, accompanied by the delegation of
responsibility for specific fragments to particular employees acts as a multifaceted means of
control.

By dividing conception from implementation, and authority from responsibility, the

division of labor not only circumscribes employees, but deskills them.

Deskilled workers are
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more easily replaced workers - providing a further means of maintaining the concentration of
power at the level of management (e.g. Braverman 1974; Edwards 1979).
The bureaucratization of teachers' work provides an analogous case.

By creating

numerous similarly subdivided teaching positions - the "egg crate" model of bureaucracy - the
organization lessens its dependence on any single teacher and therefore lessens the power of the
faculty in general.
This second form of constraint goes a long way towards illustrating how control may be
achieved in schools.
mechanism.

Internal organizational bureaucratization, however, is not a fool-proof

Since the seminal studies of the "informal" organization, and of the salience of

organization members' norms, generations of researchers have substantiated the limits of
bureaucratization and important role of employee culture in the issue of control.

This role is the

subject of the next section.
C. Unobtrusive Controls
In theory, teachers' belief systems and the organizational culture of school faculties are
especially likely to be a major factors in the success or failure of organizational control.
Indeed, the observation that the technology of teaching is not amenable to bureaucratization is
the basis of both the loose coupling perspective and the empowerment view.

In order to

achieve organizational control of intangible and indeterminate activities, such as teaching,
analysts of power have argued that organizations must rely on unobtrusive means, whereby
employees themselves restrict the range of alternatives (e.g. Perrow 1986, p. 130; Ouchi 1977;
Simpson 1985).

However, the existence and success of such internal normative mechanisms

are difficult to discern.

In organizational settings characterized by normative controls, the
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mechanisms used to insure conformity are usually taken for granted by respondents and may not
be readily apparent to researchers (Etzioni 1961). The question here is: what is the normative
culture of teaching and is it a source of resistance or acquiescence to the hierarchical structure of
schools, a source of conflict or consent?
Traditionally, studies of the occupational culture of teachers have largely supported the
loose coupling view of schools.

Typically, such research has begun with the observation by

Waller that schools are really small societies composed of three primary groups - students,
administrators and teachers - with divergent and contradictory needs and interests.
a subculture at cross purposes with the expectations and ends of the others.

Each forms

The resulting

structural cleavages, in this view, generate a divided, unsupportive and competitive culture and
climate in schools (Waller 1932; Becker 1953; Bidwell 1965; Lortie 1969, 1973, 1975, 1977;
Dreeben 1973, 1976).
The role of teachers, caught between the contradictory demands of an unsympathetic
administration and the students, who resist and resent their efforts, parallels that of the classic
"man in the middle" (Whyte and Gardner 1945). Like plant foremen, teachers are responsible
for and dependent on reliable motivation and performance from their students.

Similar to other

kinds of "people work," the "technology" of the teaching occupation thus demands flexibility,
give and take, and making exceptions.

But these needs inevitably clash with administrative

demands for rationalization, uniformity and control.

According to this view, in order to allow

"production" to proceed, it thus becomes necessary for administrators to allow a limited teacher
discretion and autonomy - hence, looseness - over classroom instruction to generate cooperation
and motivation in both staff and students.

As a result of these structural conditions and of an
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indeterminate technology, the direction of the teacher's focus necessarily lies inward to their
classrooms.

This focus is enhanced by teachers' relative spatial isolation in segregated

classrooms, further segmenting collegial relations and consequently weakening organizational
coordination.

The resulting occupational orientation of teachers, according to this tradition, is

characterized by extreme individualism, commitment to the organization and acceptance of the
manner in which schools are organized.

Hence, in the loose coupling view, teacher culture is

one of consent not conflict, of commitment not challenge.
There are good reasons, however, to consider an alternative interpretation of this portrait
of the culture of teachers.

Although the loose coupling view holds that consent and compliance

by teachers is a voluntary choice, there is evidence suggesting it is actually a subtle mechanism
of organizational control.
Students of power argue that the validity of either interpretation is an empirical question
requiring one to show that the subordinates in question would act differently if they had the
opportunity, but are prevented from doing so by identifiable mechanisms of constraint (Frey
1971, 1985; Lukes 1974; Gaventa 1980; Hartsock 1985).

They suggest that one method by

which such questions may be tested is by examining settings where such premises are absent or
where there are points of breakdown of the normative order. That is, do teachers act differently
in situations in which the individualized ideology and the structure of power which it supports
are challenged or absent?
The contending positions within the current school reform movement provide one such
test case.

Until recently the prevailing view - quite consistent with the loose coupling

perspective - has been that schools, especially those in the public sector, are hopelessly
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uncoordinated and poorly controlled.

Successful reform, this view has thus argued, must focus

on more rigorous training in schools of education, greater accountability in the schools, stringent
top-down state controls and a general "tightening of the ship" (Rosenholtz 1985; Goodlad 1985;
Weis et al. 1989).

The appearance of the newer view that schools are already tightly controlled

and must be "restructured" by increasing "teacher empowerment" through "school-based
management" has widened the margins of debate and, as I have described earlier, begun to
challenge the assumptions embedded in the loose coupling perspective.

It offers evidence

suggesting that teachers, despite apparent acquiescence, have actually not been in agreement
with the traditional structure of schools and if given the opportunity would prefer an alternative
form of organization (e.g. Bacharach et al. 1988). In other words, it lends support to the
argument that the widespread acceptance of the structure of schools has been a form of
unobtrusive power, rather than consent.

Indeed, it suggests that the "consensus" that exists is

both imposed and taken-for-granted.
But, if it is true that teachers favor the newer disempowerment view of schools and
support structural reform, how has the prevailing hierarchy for so long remained unchallenged?
Ironically, institutional theory provides the means to understand how intraorganizational
control and order can exist in the absence of obvious indicators and without serious challenge.
Institutionalization occurs when processes and patterns become structured into legitimate forms
and can be characterized as a variable ranging from totally taken-for-granted to totally negotiated
situations (Zucker 1977).

A major insight of the institutionalists is to point out the influence of

such institutions far beyond their overt and direct effects; such structuration involves the
construction and legitimization of rules and roles, that once established, are reproduced by the
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weight of precedent alone.

As such, people and organizations replicate and conform to such

patterns, rather than rationally and consciously plot out alternatives, in a manner akin to March
and Simon's "performance programs" (1958; Simon 1957).

Organization members' thought and

behavior are controlled, in this view, by organizational vocabularies and proper communication
channels that limit information, set up expectations, provide foci and curtail the search for
alternatives.

In sum, these patterns become naturalized and serve to invisibly coordinate

ostensibly decoupled activities and consequently, the hierarchical roles of teacher, administrator
and student become taken-for-granted institutions.
Hence, institutionalization can potentially make invisible, natural and unobtrusive the
forms and degrees of control and power present. There is a second overlapping sense, however,
in which unobtrusive control may operate; not only is the hierarchical structure taken for granted,
it can also be obscured.

One of the more insightful examples of this is Bourdieu and Passeron's

(1977) discussion of how the role of schools in the reproduction of inequality is masked through
the misrecognition of such hierarchic social relations, by the production of rationalizations and in
unconscious self censorship.
Occupational socialization in schools of education provides an illustration of this
institutionalization and mystification of teachers' subordinate role. The ideology of
professionalism, promoted in teacher training programs, does not question the claims of loose
coupling but effectively justifies it as a necessary decentralization allowing professional
autonomy and individual accountability.
Threats to the normative order can also be bolstered by selective recruitment in schools.
Researchers have found that school systems screen candidates as to their consistency with school
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goals, procedures and standards and use recruitment as an important means for controlling staff
performance (Bidwell 1965; Zeigler and Peak 1970).
Research has also illustrated the role of school committees in maintenance of the status
quo.

It is common for schools to coopt teachers' time, competence and cooperation in

after-hours meetings.

Such committees are usually of an advisory status (Bidwell 1965;

Corcoran et al. 1988).

Consequently, rather than decentralizing authority relations, such forms

of delegation, precisely because they do appear as employee input, can actually function to
inexpensively maintain centralized control.
Perhaps the most effective mechanism of unobtrusive control, however, arises from the
nature of the teaching labor process itself.

The non-routine and complex character of teaching

provides a potential point of vulnerability in administrative efforts at bureaucratic control. The
loose coupling view may be correct in pointing out that schools must grant some degree of
latitude to teachers.

In fact, it is because of the necessity of such de-routinization, that "work to

rule" strikes by teachers' unions are conceivable. But this potential source of independence can
be turned to quite opposite uses.

Burawoy's (1979) discussion of "making out" in the case of

blue collar employees and Edward's (1979) analysis of bureaucratic controls throughout industry
provide illustrations of how this process works.

In each example, groups embedded in a

hierarchy of power relations are neither rigidly controlled agents of their superordinates nor
autonomous actors.

They are relatively autonomous and in carrying out the internal imperatives

of their position they unwittingly serve to reinforce the power of superordinate groups.
There is some evidence to suggest that such mechanisms of control do operate in schools.
For instance, detailed ethnographies have shown how, caught between the imperatives of the
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bureaucracy and the needs of adolescents, the teaching task becomes a balancing act in which
rationalized rules and roles are themselves negotiated and socially constructed (Cicourel and
Kitsuse 1963; Cicourel et al. 1974; Mehan 1978). The objective of the teacher becomes the
accomplishment of control over uncertainties generated by an organizational structure over
which they have little control.

Ironically, in diligently bending the rules and devising

manipulative strategies in order to meet the internal demands inherent to their organizational
position, teachers struggle to maintain the same organizational structure that denies them the
power, autonomy and resources to adequately accomplish their task in the first place.
Thus, by delegating a limited "discretion" and "relative autonomy" to teachers, it is
possible for administrators to both gain employee commitment, thwart challenges and divest
responsibility for student performance.

Notably, as I showed in the foregoing section, this

division of labor involves the delegation of responsibility, not real decision-making power.

As

in Selznick's classic discussion (1949, pp. 259-261), such cooptation serves to increase the
legitimacy and control of power holders.
This third form of control, that of unobtrusive mechanisms, provides a further illustration
of how control can operate in schools.

Schools may exhibit an apparent absence of coupling

because the rules and roles comprising the hierarchical division of labor have become so taken
for granted and so obscured they are invisible. Thus challenge becomes literally unthinkable.
Hence, these institutionalized belief systems serve to invisibly coordinate ostensibly decoupled
activities.

Such "consensual" social control is just what loose coupling accounts overlook.

4. Conclusion
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The foregoing section has attempted to map the mechanisms of faculty control in schools.
I have shown that a great deal of evidence undermines post-rationalist claims that schools are
loosely coupled organizations and that teachers are autonomous employees little affected by the
actions of administrators. These claims result from three unexamined assumptions underlying
such research, which effectively preclude the discovery of a range of possible forms of control
and power in school organizations.

Measures of bureaucracy, coupling and control are, I have

argued, contingent. Such assessments depend on where one looks, by what criteria one
evaluates them and how one conceptualizes them. In contrast to traditional school research,
when we examine the social functions of schools, look beyond oversimplified notions of
bureaucracy and take into account a range of possible mechanisms of control, schools appear to
be quite tightly coupled organizations.
However, simply countering the loose coupling perspective with an opposite label for
schools - as tightly coupled organizations - is also far too simplistic.

It is important to carefully

distinguish among the different components and characteristics of organizational order. In this
analysis, I have examined only one component of organizational coupling - control.

My

assumption has been that the distributions of power, influence and control are crucial and salient
variables.

But because schools have a highly centralized organizational structure does not

imply, of course, that they are otherwise exemplars of machine-like, coupled, efficient and
rational organizations.

In fact, students of power in organizations tell us that the concentration

of influence often has an inverse relationship with other organizational linkages such as
consensus, commitment and communication (e.g. Tannenbaum et al. 1974; Hackman and
Oldham 1980; Kanter 1977; Whyte and Blasi 1981; Perrow 1986).

In other words, a high
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degree of centralization in organizations may tend to promote divisiveness and conflict and
inhibit sharing among members.

To the extent that the processes of teaching and learning

require collegiality and cooperation, such a centralized hierarchy, while it may promote
efficiency in some areas, will be inefficient for these functions.

This, of course, is a point made

repeatedly over the years by critics of school organization (e.g. Dewey 1902; Waller 1932;
Silberman 1970; Goodlad 1985; Shanker 1989).
Acknowledging the complexity of the relationship among different types of linkages
within organizations reveals the extent to which the loose coupling vocabulary confounds many
of the diverse components of intraorganizational order (i.e. interdependence, coordination,
control) and masks their interrelationships.

Such an acknowledgment also undermines the

oversimple stereotype, implicitly supported by the loose coupling perspective, that distinguishes
the purportedly efficient private sector from the presumably inefficient public sector.

Careful

delineation of these relationships may be able to provide an alternative explanation of the
anomaly of loosely coupled systems by showing how some forms of organizational tightness
cause other forms of organizational looseness.
Necessary now is more systematic and detailed investigation into the questions of to what
degree, in regard to which organizational tasks, under what conditions, in which organizations
and with what consequences, which forms of tight and loose coupling hold. Schools are an
important starting point because they are a theoretically significant case within organization
theory; they have been a puzzling anomaly.

It is precisely because of this that schools are an

ideal site with which to rethink and revisit the basic theoretical framework by which organization
theorists have examined coupling and control in general.

Moreover, my analysis has shown
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that there are compelling reasons to do so.

For, if schools, usually assumed to be extremes in

looseness, are in significant ways tightly controlled organizations, the degree of decoupling in
other kinds of organizations is thrown into question as well.

It is to this larger paradigm that I

now turn.
Ironically, for all their criticisms of traditional rational models, the loose coupling
perspective shares with them a number of fundamental notions about the behavior and structure
of organizations. This perspective does not question traditional assumptions of rational
organizational life so much as react to them by depicting those organizations in which an overall
common rationality apparently does not exist.

Nevertheless, underlying their argument is a

Hobbesian view of social order as rational exchange and utilitarian interaction.

Rational

theorists all assume organizational life, whether the conscious pursuit of self-interest or not, to be
composed of atomized free agents and use the concept of efficiency as both a desirable end state
and an explanatory variable (Salaman 1978).

Such a view derives from the neo-classical

dichotomy between rational and non-rational which defines the former in narrowly economic
terms and the latter in presumably sociological terms.
This thinking is an example of what Granovetter (1985) describes as an underembedded
account of social action. In not finding organizational rationality such researchers presume the
absence of overall social order altogether.
constitutes a failure.

Any slippage between rationality and reality

What results is a search for explanations of this supposed disorder and

strategies for managing its existence.

But that schools, for instance, maintain such internal

consistency and stability as they do, points to the efficacy of other sources of coupling and
structure.

By focussing on non-rationalities, looseness, dissensus and lack of standardization,
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analysts overlook the enormous similarities in school organizations (cf. Parsons 1959; Silberman
1970).

What they miss is social order so taken for granted that its import is not recognized as a

variable.
The assumptions of rationality stand in contrast to the embeddedness thesis - a
long-standing theme within sociology (e.g. Durkheim 1933; Polanyi 1944; Granovetter 1985;
Swedberg 1987). Durkheim, for instance, called attention to the precontractual underpinnings to
rationality and exchange and argued that the latter are both historically situated moral orders like
any other.

It is the social relations in which behavior is embedded that loose coupling and

rational theorists alike, underemphasize.
is just that.

In this instance, both ignore that a model of rationality

As such, it is a social construct and a metaphor (Morgan 1980).

To be sure, institutionalists, if not other loose coupling analysts, have emphasized the
normative context of schools and view it as a source of the organizational structure of schools.
They specifically suggest this as an alternative explanation to task-oriented theories of structure.
In fact, institutional theory is widely recognized as a sophisticated attempt to construct a
contemporary theory of organization that transcends traditional rationalistic explanations of
organization structure by describing the relationships among organizations and their social
environments (Zucker 1987, 1988).

These scholars, however, in reacting to narrowly rational

models of organization, go to the other extreme. Their cultural and sociological approach is an
example of what Wrong (1961) and Granovetter (1985) describe as an oversocialized
conception; interorganizational consensus and organizational structure are the result of an
unproblematic reproduction of social norms.

Oversocialized perspectives, although antithetical

to undersocialized conceptions, are also fundamentally underembedded accounts.

That is, they
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assume an atomized view of social life and miss underlying social organization. They
underemphasize, at the intraorganizational and micro-level, power networks, patterns of behavior
and processes of internal structuration.
rational theorists.

My argument is not that loose coupling analysts are

Indeed, they explicitly offer their theoretical framework as an alternative to

such traditional rational models of organization. My argument is that they reproduce elements
of rational models, whether they intend to or not.
In fact, the three key assumptions underlying the loose coupling perspective, upon which
I have focussed, are examples of this.
goals and purposes.

The first assumption concerns the definition of school

The near universal concern with instruction and, by extension, its

measurement by standardized tests, represents a rationalistic view of schools.

This

underemphasizes the institutional and social character of schools by translating issues of social
control into ostensibly technical and value-free activities.
The second assumption concerns the criteria by which schools are judged.

The idea that

schools should be judged in comparison to the machine model also betrays a rationalistic and
technical orientation.

By framing such evaluations in the vocabulary of rationality and

efficiency, this comparison obscures the underlying interests and values at stake.
Finally, the loose coupling perspectives' adherence to an underembedded account leads to
a third shortcoming - the neglect of the underlying social organization of power.

Again, this is

ironic given this perspectives' emphasis on pluralism, dissensus, politics and the differing values
of individuals and groups who must negotiate and compromise.

In this view, organizations,

composed of actors whose divergent needs and values compete, need to insure the cooperation
and adjustment of all in the attempt to achieve consensus.

Organization structure thus is both a
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source of differentiation of interests and a mechanism for mediating differences.
However, this represents an example of what political scientists such as Frey (1971,
1985), Lukes (1974), Gaventa (1980), and Hartsock (1985) have insightfully criticized as a
pluralistic account of power.

In their view, such accounts overly focus on direct controls,

explicit decision making and observable conflicts. These models sever actors from their social
contexts by treating them as individual rational agents.

By emphasizing the ambiguities and

dissensus in organizational life, pluralists underemphasize the underlying realities of ownership
and control which shape visible behaviors and neglect to examine institutional, cultural,
structural and indirect forms of power and the attendant suppression of conflict.
In sum, my contention is that the loose coupling perspective has offered an incomplete
and faulty view of the organization of schools.

This faulty view, I have maintained, has

resulted from the unexamined assumptions underlying such research.

These assumptions,

ironically enough, are straight out of traditional rational theories of organization. It is the
resulting underembedded framework, which underemphasizes the social organization and
institutional character of organizations, that is responsible for the anomaly of loosely coupled
organizations.
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